You may have already heard what [we] decided…to make Europe’s economy the most competitive knowledge-based one in the world. And this is where it gets difficult. South Eastern European countries have to follow the same path as the EU…this process is ultimately all about integration. Your integration into the EU is fundamental…Research policy is an important tool to facilitate this integration.
Potočnik, Speech, Ljubljana, 29 Sep 2006: Why invest in science in South Eastern Europe?
Reading the speech above today is quite intriguing (assuming the text matches what he read out). Here was the EU science & research commissioner, Potočnik (a Slovenian economist), addressing an audience in his home country, two years after EU entry (& 15 years since it exited Yugoslavia).
Yet, is there not a lack of vision, and not just that? The question mark in the title as if science in the region was in question; little explicit mention of the wrenching events of the last 20 years (including a terrible war); no praise of the region’s scientific achievements; and so on (reading the whole speech). What gives? Perhaps it was just not politic to mention these things, or it was assumed they were understood. Evidently, though, the context of the speech, the history that proceeded it, and what happened subsequent, might be instructive – or at least that is the premise of what follows.
In these notes we look at Europe’s scientific responses to the crisis of 1989, such as we can know them; the greatest change in European affairs since WWII that few apparently saw coming (and which has obviously attracted a large analytical literature, which regrettably no one could read in its entirety).
A region with a population of about 100 million people, with a significant scientific infrastructure, was suddenly plunged into change. Obviously, the crisis was also one for science, as well as of society, politics, culture, & economy.
Evidently there is a complex economic, political, & social conundrum concerning the ways science was understood, configured, and assessed at this time. The collapse of the Eastern bloc presented a change in the way science was seen & wielded by states. But give the scale and complexity of the problem we have yet to fully understand it.
While many of the responses discussed below are probably not specific to science as such, I am interested in gathering together some readings on how the continent dealt with the historical change through its scientific activities (a vast and multi-faceted phenomenon).
In what follows, I have generally concentrated on the years immediately before & after 1989 in Eastern Europe (somewhat a-historically excluding the former USSR). Things I have not addressed are the changes in taxpayer-funded science in the West due to the end of the Cold War; nor truthfully the military R&D aspect on both sides; these are important & I will hopefully do so at a later date. All of the below is highly preliminary material; a good deal of speculation & not well organized either.
Situation as it stood before 1989
The structure of the science and technology establishments of Eastern Europe will be familiar to students of Soviet R&D and need no detailed elaboration here. A major defining element is the Academy of Sciences system. Fundamental research is performed in Academy institutes and not in the universities, whose principal responsibility is teaching. Applied research, in turn, is largely conducted within the parallel system of ministerial R&D institutes organized by industry. This design assumes the presence of a well-informed central authority actively guiding research efforts to maximize the resources available to society. In practice, the result is more often considerable fragmentation of effort because of compartmentalization, so that even applied work quite often does not address the real needs of the clients.
Popper, 1991, Science & Technology in Eastern Europe after the Flood: Rejoining the World, RAND, p. 6
If we add the large military-focused R&D sector to the above description, one could say we have captured a view of science as it was in the Eastern bloc that rings true. Indeed, in a 2010 account in the Cambridge History of the Cold War, the historian, Reynolds makes the argument that science on both sides was about military-industrial complexes; the American version was better integrated with the larger economy & society; while the Soviet system suppressed the civilian economy & restricted the flow of information (this was its ‘Achilles Heel’, he writes).
The Soviets, crude and inflexible, might by titanic efforts have managed to build the best economy of the 1890s vintage anywhere in the world, but what did it help the USSR that by the middle 1980s it produced 80% more steel, twice as much pig-iron and five times as many tractors as the USA, when it had failed to adapt to an economy that depended on silicon and software?
Hobsbawm, 1994, Age of Extremes: the Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, p. 247
Synoptic statements probably need unpacking a bit. Part of that unpacking might be to say it was quite hard for outsiders to appreciate scientific goings-on behind the ‘Iron Curtain’. Not least because science was often secret and perhaps (?) wrapped up with obfuscation, lies, Potemkin Village-type presentations, etc. (& there was no internet!). Furthermore, due to an ideological agenda built around the alleged superiority of Western science under democratic or market conditions, observers might not have spotted features that were in plain sight.
How, therefore, can we approach an understanding of scientific activities in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, in a balanced way? In the table beneath I assembled some aspects (alphabetical order) I have read about over the years & that seem to me intriguing (not at this stage drawing conclusions).
| Aspect | Themes | Reading |
| Cross-border activities | Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (1); scientific relations with developing & Western countries (scientific exchanges). Military R&D (USSR-directed): specialization, e.g., Bulgaria (radio & computers); Hungary (telecom), DDR (telephones & switchboards) – Kiss, cited in Anthony (1994). | Brine, 1992, Comecon: the Rise and Fall of an International Socialist Organization. Vast amounts written on topic of military R&D (which I have not read); I looked at Anthony, 1994, The Future of the Defense Industries in Central and Eastern Europe. Literature on scientific exchanges. |
| Environmentalism | Rising environmental awareness in face of massive industrial pollution; solutions sought (2). Protest by Solidarity (Poland), Charter 77 (Czechoslovakia) & evangelical churches (DDR). Coalitions of scientists, intellectuals and citizens gathered around environmental issues identified by analysts as crucial players in the events of 1989. | Works by Carter & Turnock, e.g., Environmental Problems in Eastern Europe (1993); Carter, 1983, Pollution in Prague: Environmental control in a centrally planned socialist country, etc. |
| Gender | Gender parity greater than Western science, e.g., in Hungary & Poland (but, apparently, not in DDR). Rose-tinted spectacles best avoided as patriarchy still often held sway. | Vast literature, e.g., Etzkowitz, et al., 2000, Athena Unbound: the Advancement of Women in Science & Technology. Works by Blagojević. |
| Management methods | Academy of science ‘system’ & universities (3). Relations between ‘branch research enterprises’, ministry, & firms (4). Activities of major firms such as Ikarus, Škoda, Zeiss Jena, etc. Integration of basic & applied research (as noted by Meske, 1997, in regard to the DDR). Yugoslavian policy of decentralized management of the economy whereby each institution or work unit formed councils that made independent decisions (5). | Could not find a synoptic account of industrial R&D in Eastern Europe (must be one somewhere?); it would be a start just identifying major firms! Insight on DDR methods in: Meske, et al., 1997, Die Integration von ostdeutschen Blaue-Liste-Instituten in die deutsche Wissenschaftslandschaft. Coverage of Yugoslav methods in: OECD, 1976, Reviews of National Science Policy – Yugoslavia. |
| Scientific content (intellectual history) | Expectation that scientific activities would be primarily application-oriented (socialist); & that social science in particular would be guided by Communist ideology. Within this general statement, though, what happens when we explore the vast range of scientific activity (questions, methods, conclusions, schools of thought) as it played out in reality? | Scientific publications & reports of the time, memoirs, biographical & autobiographical material, intellectual history, etc. (6) |
(1) Comecon was an association of Communist states founded 1949 by Stalin; dissolved 1991. Members mostly from Eastern Europe but also included Cuba, Mongolia, & Vietnam. Undertook collaborative industrial & scientific projects that were often large in scale. Notable interventions in the 1980s include the Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress up to the Year 2000 (agreed 1985). & ironically, just a few months before the events of 1989, the European Community & Comecon signed an agreement normalizing relations (EC-Comecon Joint Declaration 1988).
(2) Turnock (The Human Geography of Eastern Europe, 1989) notes various devices to reduce emissions from burning coal, such as a Czech invention of 1970 for desulfurization of low quality fuels. He also cites examples of water quality monitoring & schemes to improve river, lake & sea water quality. This implies the Eastern bloc was not necessarily that far ‘behind the West’ in recognizing the environmental destruction wrought by industrialization. Wider aspects of scientific dissidents might be usefully in scope: ‘whether official dissidents or non-Party members in low-level jobs, scientists kept up their work by subterfuge, by avoiding research with ‘political’ implications, and by changing their field of research’ – New Scientist, 3 March 1990.
(3) False (?) belief held in the West that East German universities did not conduct research but focused only on teaching led to misunderstandings & errors, during the integration process.
(4) Management approaches seem intriguing because they apparently departed substantially from ‘Western’ norms. Citing Meske (1998), ‘concepts such as competition, market orientation, “value for money” and especially the “project” (with fixed duration and costs) as the centerpiece of organisation of work inside S&T were neither well developed nor widespread. Although in the 1980s in particular attempts were made in almost all countries to link R&D more closely to enterprise innovation processes, they were not very successful because the main problem, the low interest in innovation in the enterprises, had not been resolved.’ (to be honest, the latter point is still a major problem in the West as well, citing the energy sector for one).
(5) Reality was not always as hoped; some scientific projects were centrally coordinated, e.g., the TESLA accelerator (Belgrade), said to be a failure.
(6) Vast world of knowledge. Citing Karl Hall’s Central European University (CEU) reading list: Gerovitch, 2002, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: a History of Soviet Cybernetics (including the useful literature review in the introduction); Richta, 1969, Civilization at the Crossroads: Social & Human Implications of the Scientific & Technological Revolution; Miłosz, 1953, The Captive Mind. Works of Karl Hall (CEU). Might also be useful to assemble a list of prominent scientists & seek out writing that objectively appraises their record – Stanislav Brebera (semtex), Ana Aslan (gerontology), Florentina Mosora (biophysics), György Marx (leptons), etc.
After 1989
It is obviously a struggle to take in the scale of the economic, political, & social changes that occurred in the years immediately after 1989:
- Multi-year economic collapse; restructuring; inequality. GDP fell by around about 10%; in some cases such as Bulgaria, by as much as 22% – reportedly having grown across the bloc in the years prior to 1989 (reference: Sachs, 1995, p. 22).
- War & genocide (Yugoslavia); violence (Romania)
- Substantial border changes (independence of Baltic states; Czechoslovak split)
- Crisis of authority; revolutionary conditions; greater political freedom
- Health indicators: ‘…political & economic transition in the former communist countries significantly worsened the health of these nations’ – reference: Mossialos, et al., 2005, Health Status & Living Conditions in an Enlarged Europe, pp. 21-22.
- Environmental indicators: Closing factories cut pollution but unregulated dash for cash & lack of investment in mitigation measures in some cases created problems of its own, e.g., poor water quality (Romania) – citing Carter & Turnock.
- Significant migration to Western Europe (especially after accession to the EU).
Turning specifically to the sciences, the analysts Meske, Bouché & Schneider proposed what they called a three phase model of change based on experience with East Germany (paraphrased in the table beneath).
| Phase | Explanation | Features |
| 1 | Dissolution of the former socialist system | S&T personnel cutback to approx. 20-50% of former peak level*; democratization & (potentially) greater individual autonomy; no more jobs for life; brain drain. Marginalization of S&T in view of bigger political & economic changes. |
| 2 | Consolidation of the ‘surviving’ portions of the old system & their transformation into actors with a position and behavior adjusted to the new environment | Emergence of privatized enterprises, new entrepreneurs, foreign direct investment; shift from research to a higher share of innovation activities within industry. Varying levels of intentional action taken by policymakers in regard to these changes. |
| 3 | New regional & national systems start to emerge & these simultaneously grow into full & equal participation in the international division of labor, i.e. in scientific communities and international economic relations and innovation processes | Not yet occurred (1998 -when Meske published his analysis) |
European economies in transition: Comparative analysis
While giving credit to Meske and colleagues for boiling down a vast amount of information into a very useful model that anyone might grasp, evidently, as they also point out, things will have played out in a much more chaotic & contingent manner than implied by phases; the region was diverse.
Other perspectives that might help round the picture could include:
- The industrial R&D sector had at that time (1998) received little study, according to Meske (as compared to science in the academies & universities). Much more recent work on Eastern European automotive industry by Pavlínek (e.g., here, p. 218), revealed that some R&D functions of Škoda & Autopal were retained within Czechia, but for the most part they moved overseas (?) following takeover by respectively, VW & Ford. We would need more detailed information, from multiple countries & sectors, to draw wider conclusions.
- Lived experiences as captured in biographical & autobiographic texts, oral history, & anthropological studies. One of the most interesting accounts I have read along this line is Hodges (2017) Cosmologies in Transition: Science & the Politics of Academia after Yugoslavia.
- How did the *content* of the science & research change in terms of problems sought, questions asked, methods applied, and conclusions drawn? This is going to mean engagement with a large amount of scientific detail.
- A notion rather than a method, but many early analyses talk about ‘Western’ science, as much as they do ‘Eastern’ science; there is a staged process whereby the Western model represents the ideal towards which the East moves. The imposition of analytical categories or archetypes, & the supposed direction of history, gets in the way of seeing what actually confronts our own eyes (e.g., according to the claim that the East was polluted, and the West was not, one misses out on the actual nature and scale of pollution in both places). More recent analysis is now moving towards a more nuanced interpretation.
Evidently it must have been great to have dreadful people like Nicolae Ceaușescu & their entourages out of the picture. But it also seems the level of chaos & confusion in 1989 and the years afterwards cannot be over-estimated (represented by the awful phrase ‘shock therapy’).
Scientific responses, which are relatively obscure, surely intermingle with the better known economic, social, and political changes. But even with the benefit of hindsight, I guess it is still quite hard to appraise the changes that occurred in the years after 1989. Not least because this part of the world is a vast and complex zone not quickly summed up. I think the salient point is that we will now never *fully* know how science responded to the crisis.
Policy interventions: major trends
Obviously the changes after 1989 did not *just* happen – interventions were made from various directions. Please see table beneath for a summary of interventions by various governments (such as I know them).
Overall, perhaps a lack of coherent action; piecemeal measures & certainly I have not been able to identify a Marshall Plan-type intervention. In the German case, at least, an almost ungodly speed, meaning there could not have been much proper appraisal and contemplation. But that is a very preliminary conclusion.
| Entity | Interventions |
| Eastern European governments | In some places, schemes were introduced by the governments themselves to support R&D during the transition, e.g., Poland provided (limited) support for branch institutes. (The Czech government was less prominent in supporting its own industrial R&D.) The International Visegrád Fund is notable in promoting cross-border academic activity after the turn of the millennium. |
| USA | One would imagine American involvement was substantial, but thus far I have been unable to find evidence of an overall strategy or large-scale funding scheme. It has got to be out there. |
| Russia | Important but currently have not looked. |
| EC/EU | See below |
| China | Lack knowledge but would cite the relatively-recent (2012) China-led 16/17+1 Cooperation platform (here). Recalling also the Sino-Soviet split – guessing this curtailed interactions between China & Eastern Europe prior to 1989 (key exception: Albania). No idea what happened in the years immediately following Tiananmen/1989 events. |
| German reunification* | Article 38 of Unification Treaty stipulated integration of DDR science & research into the federal system. Many assistance schemes for R&D in industry. Difficulties experienced by R&D facilities and in-house R&D units in the industrial sector; Jena Zeiss one of few East German companies thought be able to compete. Universities developed new teaching & research agendas. Significant cuts to former Academy of Sciences institutes, luckily about 30 were accepted into Blaue-Liste (Leibniz-Gemeinschaft); smaller number into Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft†; former employees also found jobs in the universities. One employee (Zentralinstitut für Physikalische Chemie, Berlin), Angela Merkel, eventually become Chancellor! |
EC/EU responses: evaluation
There exists a large community of well trained scientists who have great expertise in fundamental research on primarily classical subjects such as mathematics, mechanics, theoretical physics and materials research…The pool of sound knowledge in Central and Eastern Europe is generally underused and undervalued by both industry and by society as a whole. Thus its contribution to the competitiveness of industry and to economic growth is very limited…One of the main threats to the countries of Central and·Eastern Europe is the brain-drain: the flow of highly qualified scientists to the West.
Commission of the European Communities, 1992, Cooperation in the field of science & technology between the European Community & the countries of Central & Eastern Europe, SEC(92) 785, p. 3
As far as I can judge, there seem to be at least two rough phases in the EC/EU’s response to 1989. The initial phase, running to around 1993, was relatively fluid, experimental, & flexible. The idea of the Eastern bloc states actually joining the EU was presumably one of several options at that stage (with the exception of DDR, which joined the EU in 1990 by means of German reunification). However, this initial approach changed into a more rigid strategy of assimilation by the time of the Copenhagen summit in 1993 – citing Inglis, 2000 in: Common Market Law Review.
As a general point, it seems not entirely clear if the former USSR & Eastern bloc were treated entirely separately in the early stages. The notion that the Eastern European states would accede to the EU, while the former USSR remained outside the organization possibly came later (?). In the immediate aftermath of 1989, it must have been, perhaps, unclear whether these regions formed a group, whether they would join the EU, etc. A chaotic situation (a crisis, in other words); this is important to remember in regard to the following more specific comments on science.
There is obviously a large deal of literature on the political response of the European Commission to the events of 1989, which I regret to say I have not read. Evidently, though, the events of 1989 must have taken Delors, President of the Commission, as others, by surprise, as a speech he gave in January 1989, testifies, with its inward-facing focus on the Single European Act. Yet, I think the tune had changed to something more expansive & idealistic just a few months later.
| Date, location | Delors’ comments |
| 17 January 1989, European Parliament | As far as the ‘other Europeans’ are concerned, the question is quite simple: how do we reconcile the successful integration of the Twelve without rebuffing those who are just as entitled to call themselves Europeans? As you know, the Commission has already adopted a position on this: internal development takes priority over enlargement. Nothing must distract us from our duty to make a success of the Single Act. |
| 17 October 1989, Bruges | Given the upheavals currently under way in Eastern Europe, the problematic changes. It cannot be only a question of knowing when and how all European countries will be able to benefit from the stimulating effect and the advantages of a large market…Europeans expect more from us. Will we avoid the issue? The following question arises: what kind of society are we building? A society based on exclusion? [slightly paraphrased for brevity] |
Well, humans plan, & God laughs. Regrettably, in regard to the science, the highly detailed official history of EU R&D programs by Guzzetti (1995) does not provide as much detail as one would like (published 1995; too early to draw conclusions). Therefore I reconstructed what I could from old European Commission communications (archived online by the University of Pittsburgh). Based on these, it seems at least by 1992 the Commission had a plausible & relatively sophisticated analysis as related to science & research in Eastern Europe.
Deeper into the SEC(92) 785 communication quoted at the top of this section, we learn about priorities as the Commission defined them, based on European Parliament resolutions, discussions with the Council and with representatives from Central and Eastern Europe (table beneath)
| Priority | Explanation |
| Human resources | Central and East European countries have a large body of skilled personnel, [but] for the most part their qualifications are ‘scarcely suited to the needs of modem society in a market economy’. Training of new generation of scientists acquainted with latest research, innovation & management techniques. Preserve existing potential by enabling personnel to adapt to new technologies. |
| Industrial rehabilitation | ‘Massive investment’ in research on clean technologies, energy & ‘rational use of materials’. Cooperation in the field of information & communications technologies. Improvement of mining techniques, resource prospecting & corresponding· technologies; new ore processing methods. Minimization & recycling of industrial wastes; safe disposal of toxic wastes. |
| Quality of life | Pollution control & environmental clean-up; energy saving, alternative energy sources & nuclear reactor safety. Epidemiological research, research on AIDS, cancer & respiratory diseases; efficiency & control of health expenditure, health legislation & protection of users’ interests. Quality of food, distribution chains & preservation procedures. |
As we learn from SEC(92) 785, and other communications of the early 1990s [e.g., COM (94) 420 & COM(95) 489], the EU response was often built around information exchange – know-how flowing from the West, eastwards, to fill perceived deficits in the East (via fellowships, networks, joint projects, etc.). As we can see from the language in COM(95) 489, the Commission possibly even started conceiving Eastern European programs as part of wider international development (with all the added & misleading knowledge-deficit conceptions that brings in turn). Given the aspirations expressed above, one must admit the budget was not equal to the task.
The table at the end of this article summarizes various schemes that I have heard about. The initial PHARE & INTAS schemes, which had scientific elements, turned out to be inadequate (apparently). But at least in the PHARE case, the scheme was not simply reinforced or expanded (as might have been logical); a new tack was instead taken, namely the PECO-COPERNICUS program, alongside ad hoc admission (later full admission) to the Framework Program (R&D funding). The Commission was probably struggling to grip the issues within its bureaucracy & find a groove (?).
Big caveat – haven’t looked at a single archive & therefore pure speculation follows. But it seems the shift in ‘strategy’ was not inevitable; it possibly had something to do with the idea apparently prevalent in the Commission that interventions such as PHARE made outside the Framework Program (alongside interventions that had nothing obvious to do with Eastern Europe) should be regularized in bureaucratic terms (i.e., brought into a standard format).
A subject which had come up on several occasions was that of Preparation, Follow-up and Support Activities (APAS) in the scientific and technological field. For various reasons, a series of programmes and research and development initiatives had been funded apart from the framework programme. They included the…programmes launched on the initiative of the European Parliament to offer scientific support to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union…lt therefore needed to be decided how APAS fitted in, and how to share financial resources between them and similar specific programmes covered by the framework programme.
Guzzetti, 1995, p. 159
I do not know what APAS is or why it mattered; but it might be a standard way for bureaucracies to digest new developments – by pressing them into an existing template – but perhaps it was not the right approach given the unique scale, and possibly unprecedented features, of this particular crisis. After hitching Eastern Europe to the Framework Program – and indeed, the accession negotiations – the approach became one of trying to integrate the Eastern bloc states into the preexisting EU schemes, rather than bespoke responses. Had the bureaucracy found its groove by the middle of the 1990s (& was it the ‘right’ one)?
Now let us try to appraise the success of the EU’s approaches through these years. One key measure, at least later on, was financing levels in the Framework Program, according to the view that being able to compete within this system would certify that the East was competitive internationally. Obviously a good deal of study has been done on this issue because it relates to the allocation of EU funds; Schuch (2014), drew the following conclusion:
It was supposed that the association of these [new accession] countries with the European Framework Programmes for RTD (FPs) could contribute to internal reforms provided that local scientific communities are proactive. However 15 years after the first full association the level of participation of the EU13 in FPs is still low.
This suggests that the EU schemes were, in a way, a failure; we would have expected a rise in Eastern European participation as reform schemes kicked in. But let us unpack his phrase ‘It was supposed’. The European Parliament also conducted a thorough study of the issue (2018):
We conclude…that the distribution of the FP7 budget is ‘statistically proportional’ to the Member State contributions to the EU budget, in other words…the country[‘s] EU membership fee is the best predictor of the gained support.
Therefore it seems at least in the FP7 case, that Eastern Europe ‘lost out’ because they only got out what they put in, not because of other qualities. The EU decided that it would not give more cash, for political reasons, to scientists based in Eastern Europe (juste retour); then very complex explanations were developed to explain what was at base a simple political decision.
Regrettably, through much of the process, a good deal of the rhetoric was based somewhat on stereotypes & an apparently ‘standard’ assumption that the East had to reach (presumed) Western levels, which possibly hampered smarter or more even-handed approaches.
It therefore seems worthwhile re-appraising the seemingly more fluid & possibly sympathetic, if not idealistic, elements of some of the EC/EU responses in the immediate aftermath of 1989 that imply alternative futures were possible.
More generally, the [European] Union is mindful of ways in which an end to the isolation of scientists in East and West might be of great advantage to both sides, and of how science may be the field in which cultural reunification of the continent can make most rapid progress.
Guzzetti, 1995, p. 174
Returning, now, finally to the concern about brain drain, related to budget cuts in the East; we must note the significant migration of skilled workers, including scientists, to the West; as well as scientists moving into other walks of life within their own country or region. The brain drain obviously has two elements, namely, the direct loss to the state from the departure of skilled labor, but also the lost sunk costs due to investment in training of that individual before they left.
The number of researchers in Romania is in continuous decline. If in 1989, there were more than 150000 researchers working in Romania, in 2002, official statistics recorded only 38433 employees in the research field, and now there would be about 12000…it is estimated that 15000 researchers have left Romania in recent years.
Baltes, 2017, The critical situation of R&D in Romania: the main cause of the Romanian researchers’ migration, in: Marinescu, p. 225
Put another way, of course, the former Eastern bloc ‘exported’ people, ideas, & entrepreneurship, but it did so without receiving appropriate recompense, or even recognition. The prime beneficiaries of this ‘export’ in Europe have probably been Germany, UK, Switzerland & Scandinavia; outside Europe, Canada & USA. In this sense, human capital was to a degree retained in global terms; EU accession was effective in the sense it presumably facilitated the brain drain in the direction of the Western member states via free movement regulations (rather than elsewhere in the world).
Conclusion
Having dug through some relevant material I feel a bit better informed, but certainly not in a position to draw any conclusions. I have obviously barely scratched the surface of a vast world of knowledge. Some pure guesses & speculations beneath, not gathered in any particular coherent order.
It seems, based on the material I have seen, that one element of the scientific response was for scientific activities to very substantially shrink. This shrinkage took place in what seems a quite unsystematic way, taken across the entirety of scientific activities, because science did not, in general, matter. Imagine at the very least the human cost in terms of anxiety, stress, discombobulation, poverty, etc.; no doubt eventually in some cases broken dreams, in others, new horizons.
Disparaging remarks were made about the quality of Eastern bloc science by some Western scientists. Given the fact that women were prominent in parts of the Eastern bloc’s scientific enterprise, coupled to the fact those doing the disparaging were mostly men, putting two and two together, one could hypothesize there was a gender element to that disparagement.
There was also a political element – an ideological agenda built around the alleged superiority of Western science under democratic or market conditions that was reinforced if not validated by the collapse of the Eastern bloc.
Contrary to the enthusiasm of the wall smashers & the dreamers of a new Europe, was there also a note of cynicism in the Western scientific response? Was idealism around building a new kind of European science absent from most policy discussions, not to mention a broader sense of the cultural and societal gains from investing taxpayer funding in it? Presumably, a good deal of debate happened, but I don’t know enough about it to answer the question. Judgement could well have been clouded, though, and genuine collaboration thereby closed off, not least because 1989 suddenly tipped the power differential in favor of the West.
One thing that struck me was the largely economic gauging of science in Eastern Europe after 1989. It was measured against its ability to generate cash in what was configured as the international market. Yet, conversely, science in the West was not judged against this standard; otherwise the West German Government would have cut the entirety of the Max Planck, as well as the ‘dead weight’ (otherwise known as capacity) that taxpayer-funded science systems carry (which it did not – indeed, Western European countries have increased their taxpayer-funded R&D spending).
Taxpayer-funded science & research has other purposes than growing the economy; indeed, rarely is national economic gain its main purpose, or something that it could even hope to achieve (least of all in a collapsing economy subject to ‘shock therapy’ wrought by external forces).
Consider, for example, taxpayer-funded science’s cultural purposes – obviously very significant in this case given the portrayal of Western science as dominant, of higher quality and greater utility. The role of science in articulating Communist virtues or national prowess is also well-known, but these of course had been thrown out by the events of 1989. Prior to 1989, one major role of East-West scientific exchange was diplomatic – as a very public means of encouraging cooperation & dialogue. This element seems to have been lost among the economic claims I have read, without saying it was completely absent.
It would be good to know the exact details, for example, of how the DDR’s Academy of Sciences was assessed and why particular cuts and closure decisions were made by the West German authorities during reunification. In the absence of such information (it no doubt exists but I have not seen it), the most noticeable thing about the whole process was the speed that it happened, driven by a desire to cut funding to East German institutes as soon as humanly possible (citing the aforementioned Brill).
Serious appraisals could surely not be made in such a short time span, mindful action could not fully occur, nor was time allowed for more gradual adjustment. Evidently a core feature of the crisis was that science was thrown away, and evidently also this issue was recognized at the time by some policymakers as brain drain, and seen as a concern. Dissecting out panic & mistakes from ideological considerations such as a belief in the superiority of the West, or the ‘shock therapy’, is hard; all seem salient.
I urged the Solidarity leadership [Poland] to abandon visions of “market socialism,” and to go for a market-capitalist economy.
– Sachs, 2012, What I did in Russia
Shock therapy is a term of art; it was not enacted everywhere; even where it was ostensibly enacted, such as Poland, things surely played out in more complex ways (as always). Regardless of the approach taken, outputs declined & the economy suffered immediately after 1989; anyone who claimed to have identified the ‘right way’ was making a misleading claim (this was a new problem and there was not one set way to deal with it). In the first few months or years everything was surely much more fluid; different responses were tried. Within this landscape, certain actors, represented by Sachs, for example, worked hard to gain control of the narrative. But it was not preordained; history does not play out like this. A lot of factors were in movement; a lot was up for grabs (literally, & figuratively).
The possibility exists, therefore, that scientific responses could have mitigated some of the worst impacts of the transition, as scientists searched for their own responses to the crumbling of norms around them. Aspects such as measuring, regulating or controlling environmental pollution or other societal issues such as health; solving day-to-day problems; and so forth, were touched upon in discussions but perhaps not fully explored in practice. As we see in indicators such as overall health, environmental aspects, not to mention outflow of people escaping poverty, there was evidently a demand for such work.
Hypothetically, & judged more broadly, scientific activities in the Eastern bloc therefore might have been both relatively high performing, and relatively well-managed, compared to counterparts in Western Europe (or at least as much as could be under the circumstances). In other words, the picture might warrant re-appraisal within a more realistic & even-handed framework of what taxpayer-funded science does when everything else is in motion (the definition of a crisis).
While I do not have the data to make specific comments on elements lost through the transition process, we can say gender balance, relations between R&D & industrial production, devolved work units (Yugoslavia), international collaborative approaches, the academy of science system, environmental movements, etc., all present intriguing elements. With hindsight, & looked at more broadly, all of these might have been seen as cultural treasures, even sources of learning, for Europe in general.
Military & industrial innovations could have been ‘asset stripped’ by overseas governments & firms; I simply cannot tell. I don’t know anything about the military side other than there were worries that scientists with knowledge of WMD would hand material to the ‘wrong’ people (i.e., asset stripping). In the case of industry, I lack knowledge of the detailed, granular, evidence on its fate (industrial research is a bit of a mystery in the studies I have seen).
The Škoda & Autopal examples cited above suggest scientific know-how could have been moved abroad (often to Germany?). One might also note, however, the Renault take-over of Dacia (respectively, French & Romanian firms). Obviously from a market or knowledge economy perspective, this would be fine & indeed expected & hoped for, but it would have been delivered in a pretty insincere way given the simultaneous disparagement of Eastern European science from some quarters. Measuring the impacts across the economies concerned would, also, presumably be complex – a longer-term effect that might apply to particular firms and places, noting the overall lack-luster growth of say, the German economy in the 1990s (excepting the brief reunification ‘boom’).
The EC/EU appears to be one of the prominent official players in terms of taxpayer-funded science in the region; it recognized the core elements of the crisis relatively early, but perhaps not its exact nature. In the end, the Commission cleaved to established working practices such as the Framework Program, rather than trying more experimental approaches.
It could not mobilize the required resources nor, perhaps, the right way of thinking about the problem. As such, one could say the EC/EU did not respond adequately to the task, but of course its actions were limited not just by the intellectual frameworks that established themselves & became dominant in the early 1990s, but also member state governments’ desires (e.g. budgets requested by Commission not granted in full, and so on).
EC/EU schemes to support science & research in Eastern Europe
List is very incomplete – just includes various interventions I have stumbled across over the years.
| Year(s) | Intervention | Explanation |
| 1990-n.d. | Poland & Hungary: Aid for Restructuring Economies (PHARE) (1) | Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania & Yugoslavia; assistance for economic restructuring including education, training and R&D; ECU 140m (1992); ECU 10 million (1993) |
| 1991-n.d. | Technical Assistance to Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) | Similar to PHARE but applied to former USSR. ECU 400m (1991); ECU 450m (1992). |
| 1991-1993 | Europe Agreements (EAs) | Initially proposed not as a route to accession but as an alternative to it. No idea what the content was or if anything relevant to science. |
| 1992-1994 | Community of Pan European Research Networks of Interdisciplinary Centres and Universities in Sciences (PECO-COPERNICUS) (2) | Aimed to ‘create a pan-European research community’; entailed FP3 participation in joint research projects, scientific networks, fellowships, etc.; ECU 140m budget |
| 1992-present | International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) (3) | Assist military engineers & weapons scientists from the former USSR to move into civilian activities, primarily to prevent WMD knowledge falling into the wrong hands; initially financed via ECU 20m from EC (TACIS), US$25m (USA), & US$17m (Japan). Still operating now with HQ in Kazakhstan; however, range of former Soviet states covered has narrowed (?); South Korea & Norway now members. |
| 1993-2007 | International Association for the Promotion of Cooperation with Scientists from the New Independent States (INTAS) (3) | Established by European Commission to support information exchange on non-military scientific matters between Western Europe and the former USSR. |
| 1994-2013 | Accession process | Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (2004); Romania & Bulgaria (2007); Croatia (2013) |
| 2004 (?)-present | Officially-designated ‘candidate countries’ in Eastern Europe as listed on the EU’s website, i.e., Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (4) | Negotiations on ‘science & research’ reportedly ‘concluded’ for Montenegro (2012); & Serbia (2016) |
| 2008-present | Science for Carpathians | Connects scientists in Central Europe, defines research priorities for region & enhances international collaboration with external partners |
| 2009-present | EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) | Networks encouraging links between R&D institutions, SMEs, etc., e.g., BSR Stars. €215m (2007-2013); n.d. on funding after 2013. |
| 2010-present (?) | EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) | Significant number of goals to promote S&T cooperation; no further data gathered on this though. Scientific initiatives included Danube-INCO.NET (FP7) |
| n.d. | Western Balkans Regional R&D Strategy for Innovation | Initiatives would appear to have included WBC-RTI.info & WBC-INCO.net |
(1) PHARE was result of the work of the G7 summit in Paris on 14 July 1989. At the summit, the European Commission received a mandate for the development of PHARE, as ‘the highest foreign policy accolade the Commission had ever had bestowed upon it’. Obviously a bigger program than science, but had elements of science within it. A similar scheme, TACIS, was implemented for the former USSR in 1991; this, alongside, the acronym PHARE highlight the fact (referred to above) that it was quite fluid initially which countries were in scope. Precision in naming presumably reflects chronological point that Hungary & Poland were the first two states to reform in early 1989, while USSR only dissolved in 1991, not strategic intent as such.
Possibly also relevant are the Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and Rural Development (SAPARD) & Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA).
(2) PHARE: ‘contribution to research restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe is necessarily limited, so that it. needed to be supplemented by targeted cooperation activities in the field of science and technology. These activities would increase contacts between researchers in East and West, permit research on rehabilitation of industrial processes, contribute to preserving the high standards of science achieved and thus, in the final analysis, combat the brain drain.’
Examples included such projects as: (1) materials technology transfer in support of Hungarian industry; (2) realization of technological parks and business incubation centers in Poland; (3) fight against infectious diseases in Romania; (4) post-harvest metabolism in plant organs & tissues in Czechoslovakia; (5) developing algorithms and programming techniques; (6) computer science & information technology in Poland; (7) preservation of human potential; (7) transformation of the higher education and research systems in Central and Eastern Europe; & (8) involvement of research organizations from Central and Eastern Europe in ETEX, European Tracer Experiment.
In the first round of bids, 11750 proposals were drawn up for a total of ECU 1.6 billion, i.e. 30 times more than the available amount.
(3) INTAS & ISTC were established as private bodies in Belgium law.
(4) Officially designated candidate countries; source is: European Neighborhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations – Check current status (accessed August 2020).
Various sources including COM(94) 420
Note on sources
Below a list of sources that I have stumbled upon over the years (no particular order). Very incomplete & an illustration of my lack of reading, & therefore lack of understanding, on this topic.
Inevitably, I think, one has to read across a diverse range of academic traditions (& different approaches) to gain an understanding.
Oreskes & Krige, 2014, Science and Technology in the Global Cold War
Reynolds, 2010, Science, technology & the cold war, in: The Cambridge History of the Cold War
National Science Foundation, 1994, Science, Technology, and Democracy in the Cold War and After: A Strategic Plan for Research in Science and Technology Studies
Harvard University, The Cold War: Perspective from East & West (online course)
Gummett, et al., 1996, Military R&D after the Cold War: Conversion and Technology Transfer in Eastern and Western Europe
Brine, 1992, Comecon: The Rise and Fall of an International Socialist Organization
Popper, 1991, Science & Technology in Eastern Europe after the Flood: Rejoining the World
von Hirschhausen & Bitzer, 2000, The Globalization of Industry & Innovation in Eastern Europe: from Post-socialist Restructuring to International Competitiveness
Meske, 2004, From System Transformation to European Integration: Science and Technology in Central and Eastern Europe at the Beginning of the 21st Century
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe
Papadimitriou, 2002, Negotiating the New Europe: The European Union and Eastern Europe
Kramer, 1993, The European Community’s response to the New Eastern Europe, in: Journal of Common Market Studies
Hollings, 2015, Scientific Communication Across the Iron Curtain
Högselius, 2005, The Dynamics of Innovation in Eastern Europe: Lessons from Estonia
Holzmann, Gács & Winckler, 1995, Output Decline in Eastern Europe: Unavoidable, External Influence or Homemade?
Hodges, 2017, Cosmologies in Transition: Science and the Politics of Academia after Yugoslavia
Federal Research Division Country Studies, Library of Congress
Falk, 2011, Resistance and Dissent in Central and Eastern Europe: An Emerging Historiography, in: East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures
Wilczynski, 2008, Comecon – success or failure? in: Australian Outlook
OECD, 1976, Reviews of National Science Policy – Yugoslavia
GRINCOH: Growth – Innovation – Competitiveness: Fostering Cohesion in Central and Eastern Europe
Schuch, Bonas & Sonnenburg, 2012, Enhancing science and technology cooperation between the EU and Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia: a critical reflection on the White Paper from a S&T policy perspective, in: Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship
Guzzetti, 1995, A Brief History of European Union Research Policy
Bussière, et al., 2019, The European Commission 1986-2000: history and memories of an institution (chapter 20)
Georghiou, 1999, Socio-economic Effects of Collaborative R&D – European Experiences, in: The Journal of Technology Transfer
Berend & Berend, 2009, From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union: The Economic and Social Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe Since 1973
Literature on the failure to come to terms with the events of 1989 and what followed (citing such authors as Spohr, Krastev & Holmes).
Drahokoupil, 2009, Globalization and the state in Central and Eastern Europe: the politics of foreign direct investment
Oral history interviews with German scientists reflecting on the experience of the restructuring of DDR scientific institutions after 1989: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLEH7vc3utI9rzcbaLAxXs_u1MZk2ZIaM7
Science Think Tank 