Précis(1)
Ehler (EPP), one of the more notable MEPs in European science policy, pointed out in July the poor turnout from his colleagues at the STOA Panel meetings. STOA is an important part of the small science policy caucus in the EP (alongside ITRE).
I have no independent information on turn-out in the STOA Panel but the number of MEPs interested in science policy, which I call the science policy caucus, will always remain small. Some individuals probably join it briefly when it touches another topic of interest to them and then exit. This is inevitable. A lot of the material of science policy is, we must admit, rarefied and therefore would never attract consistent interest.
The goal of these notes is to assess the political thought of the caucus over the past year or so. Due to lack of time my points are not well organized or properly explored. I did not have time to look at all the MEPs and consider their commentary. Therefore what follows must be viewed as mainly assertions. Apologies where I did not do justice to particular individuals or topics or misunderstood intentions.
I think all of the data has to be understood together, as difficult as that is to achieve, not broken down into separate topics, because I believe MEPs range over vast intellectual territory and formulate their views on this territory not according to manageable topic divisions. Obviously, in this account we are only looking at a small fraction of that territory, namely, science policy.
Ehler, being a prominent figure in the field, will feature but I will also look at selected MEPs from other parts of the political spectrum who tend to receive relatively less publicity. I divided up my commentary into three parts (see table beneath).
Typology of science talking points from MEPs in the current parliamentary term (examples)*
| Type | Talking point(s) |
|---|---|
| Points of political disagreement | Blocking rent-seeking behaviour of big firms. Industry participation in governance of public R&I programs. Hostility as against friendliness in science and cooperation policy. |
| Rational action and reliable knowledge | Commission has no official science adviser, ERC not accepted in that role, JRC ‘not meeting its expectations as a think tank of the Commission’, issues with the Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM).† Idea that when studying the impacts of technology and science, new fields of the social sciences had to be used in an independent way, from bioethics to digital tools and that foresight needed to be translated into sociological terms. |
| Theories of technological determinism | Splinternets, genome editing in humans, AI and digital tools in the workplace, cybersecurity, Pegasus, neurotechnology and neurorights, digital identity, language equality, IoT, blockchain, 5G technologies, quantum technologies, edge computing, 6G and satellite communications, privacy and security aspects of 5G technology, substance-based medical devices, hydrogen as an agent of decarbonization. Rarely, low tech devices, such as natural medicine. |
Points of political disagreement
Everyone in the science policy caucus will agree that science and technology are somehow important. However, there are significant (and self-evident) political divisions. There are also areas of unease, generally less articulated, felt by one side or the other.
To make some big simplifications, the left (S&D/Greens-EFA/GUE/NGL), to varying extent, wants a regime that emphasizes democratic control of science and technology and, concomitantly, the avoidance of subsidization of, or rent-seeking by, big business.
The right (EPP/Renew) is broadly content with the current dispensation. It is, presumably, confident that this dispensation will not change. What the left might see as rent-seeking it believes are legitimate state aids. Where it does criticize, it tends to be details of policy implementation.
The right-wing critique can prove insightful even if one does not agree with it. But often it runs along stock lines as critique of bureaucracy, abhorrence of regulations, and so on.
Besides the party affiliations of the MEPs, it is important also to note that DG R&I, as a major delivery instrument, must surely take EPP positions, even if it is not always card carrying. I would very much like to be wrong but it is hard for me to imagine how at present officials with pronounced socialist ideals could have tolerated working there unless they undertook regular deep breathing exercises to stay calm.
How do political tensions and other points of unease play out in the discourse of the science policy caucus?
I will look at three areas that I personally found intriguing, namely, (1) pharmaceutical R&D strategy; (2) European Investment Council; and (3) science and international cooperation (where the left seems uneasy about the agenda but does not yet have a fully-articulated position).
MEPs interested in science policy (not comprehensive)*
| Group | MEP(s) |
|---|---|
| EPP | Buşoi, Ehler, Graça Carvalho, Weiss |
| Renew Europe | Alieva-Velli, Ijabs, Hlaváček |
| S&D | Gálvez Munoz, Kaili, Leitão Marques, Toia |
| Greens-EFA | D’Amato, Ropė |
| GUE/NGL | Matias, Pereira |
Concerning pharmaceutical R&D strategy, STOA commissioned a report, Florio, et al., 2021, European pharmaceutical research and development: could public infrastructure overcome market failures?
The report is informative by summarizing a range of data on the European pharmaceutical sector. In conclusion, the authors propose a number of options to improve biomedical R&D infrastructure in Europe which they note currently exhibits ‘long term market and policy failures’. The most extensive option is a biomedical CERN to discover new medicines.
Sensible as it sounds, I believe we all know that particular option would seem politically impossible at present. There would appear to be no coalition to make it happen (as obviously the authors themselves observe). This being said, it is a useful idea to raise because it gets everyone thinking (perhaps, even, it would be better to visualise a Mondragon of medicines than a CERN, the anarchism of the former seeming to me indeed more plausible than the inter-governmentalism of the latter).(2)
Florio, lead author of the STOA report, is an economist. He is known for his critique of Margaret Thatcher’s privatization program. Pertinent to the current analysis is his commentary on covid vaccine patents dated last year. In it, he asks if the intention is for ‘the negotiating position of governments over the next 20 years on the technologies that underlie vaccines [to be] that of signing one purchase contract after another…[i.e.] a self-perpetuating machine for extracting rents for monopoly power.’
His question was rhetorical. Of course, he knows the answer is yes, that it is indeed the case, contemporary capitalism being what it is. The only relief, as he points out, would be an implausible change in the biological properties of the covid virus that renders it harmless (therefore no need for vaccines).
No one can predict the future, but, to explore his point a bit beyond what he wrote, the progressive policy question might therefore be how to curtail rent-seeking at public expense (or how to suppress the virus).
The Chinese government solution has been tried-and-tested infection control measures organized by the state, thereby rendering innovative medical countermeasures a generally marginal technology (without denying the organizational innovations of operating control measures on a large scale). In western countries, the opposite path was chosen leading to reliance on vaccines. That reliance is probably very large assuming social distancing would not be reinstated.
Looking at the USA, given the nature of their health system, withdrawal of federal subsidy and inclusion of covid vaccination boosters in private health insurance policies might occur. Politically plausible answers to the issue in Europe seem far less clear because the health systems do not necessarily work that way.
We also have the problem of innovation in the sense that it is probably not just a question of churning out the same vaccine again and again but of developing novel countermeasures, vaccine updates (R&D issue of how to reprogram the immune system), alongside, presumably, all the genomic surveillance and computer modelling infrastructure needed to try to keep ahead of the virus.
There are obviously a lot of scientific questions on these topics for which we do not yet have answers. But the left of the science policy caucus, Florio and his team are, correctly, starting a European conversation on sustainable delivery models for the innovation program that we will need (which could, of course, extend beyond covid-19 to other medical issues including other pandemic viruses).
In a crucial exchange with the MEP, Marques (S&D), last December, Florio highlighted another important point, namely, that genomic information funded by taxpayers (and placed on the internet free of charge) is transformed by the private sector into proprietary knowledge. He said that companies were not even acknowledging use of this resource, let alone paying for it.
He proposed as a solution, ‘public patents’, which would not aim for financial gain but exercise some other kind of control on behalf of taxpayers. Regrettably, the topic was not picked up further in the discussion.
Even before the corona crisis, asymmetry in scientific knowledge and expertise developed between scientists working in the public and private sector. In the private sector, a well resourced company can obtain large amounts of information free from the public domain, but also fund academic research in a propriety format, poach experts, undertake M&A, or pay consultants to uncover esoteric facts. For the public sector, private R&D is a closed world, except perhaps for a few hints, and the other avenues are legally closed or in many cases too expensive.
It would be impossible, as an example, for us to comprehensively assess the global pipeline of pre-clinical studies on potential new covid vaccines or medications, despite the obvious public import of the topic. Companies cannot be compelled to reveal information, even to officials (except in certain areas of defence research). The best one can hope is that appeals to patriotism induce the C-suite to spill the beans or some pantouflage greases the information flow.
Open science was an agenda that did not improve information asymmetry with the private sector and perhaps even made it worse. Regrettably, parts of the left mistook the agenda for democratization of science. However, it has probably not been the most significant factor in the overall problem.
Let us look at a different matter – the new European Innovation Council (EIC) that aims to subsidize what is termed deep tech.
There have been complaints about the running of the council from the private sector, namely, slow pay outs and ‘infighting’ in the Commission over the delivery model. Ehler (EPP) investigated the complaints and, in his report published earlier in the summer, developed the following main points.
- The EIC ‘needs to be rescued from the Commission’. Ehler recommends that an independent EU body is established as the main entity responsible for EIC implementation by 2025.
- An investment strategy for equity investments, including exit strategy.
Herein we find a somewhat typical EPP critique of the Commission bureaucrats who would not be up to the task, a concern to create new bodies that would probably have governance arrangements involving industry representatives, and the avoidance of back-door nationalisation (a framework of rules for acquisition and crucially, disposal, of equity stakes).
Stepping back a little, I think it is worth noting one underlying premise of EIC built around buzzwords like deep tech. The term once referred to devices that could be used at depth in the ocean. It lost that meaning and, as we can see, deep tech topics prove common talking points in STOA. The term has apparently acquired a life of its own.
Yet, the sudden popularity of deep tech as a concept in policy circles comes, according to my impression, from the right. It is not entirely clear if they see the rhetoric as a means to reform the bureaucracy, or as means to reshape science and technology, or both, and in what proportions.
It would be a bit ironic to see the supposedly non-entrepreneurial bureaucrats wielded as a means to exhort greater entrepreneurialism from a private sector that is (apparently) both hugely entrepreneurial and excessively cautious at the same time.
The private sector, of course, knows how to innovate, is perfectly capable of assessing the promise of future innovations, and has all the resources to wield science and research that anyone could possibly want. The analysis of the right can therefore seem disingenuous. The private sector does not, as such, need the support of taxpayers. There is a different kind of problem here.
The left without doubt has a realistic grasp of this factor. It needs to be constantly asking why taxpayers should subsidize technology that the private sector considers unworthy of investment. If the answer is that taxpayers really need the technology and will own it when it is developed (and those claims can be backed up), then the question is answered. But, the usual babble about creating innovation ecosystems is not going to cut it and that, I am afraid, is mostly what we get.
Again, perhaps, we see a risk of public money being expended in a way that is sub-optimal. Clearly, the priority for the upstanding public servant must be to stop that eventuality. The apparent difficulties the Commission had in implementing EIC might therefore be read in a range of ways.
From another perspective, the EIC offers an opportunity to re-consider the capacity of states to wield science and technology. This is pertinent to the theme of asymmetry in knowledge and expertise noted above.
Looking around the world, we often see reference to high-profile actions in an apparently similar genre, such as ARIA, Moonshot R&D and Cyberagentur/SPRIN-D, respectively, in UK, Japan and Germany (drawing inspiration, at least rhetorically, from ARPA in the USA).
The bureaucratic detail is that the German and British initiatives involved the creation of new agencies, while existing R&D organizations reportedly serve as operating agents for the Japanese program. The EU initiative seems to sit somewhere in the indeterminate middle ground at the moment.
Taking SPRIN-D as an example, we heard there were delays which get traced back, apparently, to bureaucrats getting in the way. On the website of the new agency we learn, indeed, that the first breakthrough innovation will be the agency itself (article dated late 2021).
Obviously, serious appraisal must wait until the new agency has actually done something substantive (according to its news feed, the agency so far reported such activities as funding some projects, organizing meetings, e.g., on antiviral medications, and published a position paper on IP).
Logically, the Commission could join forces with SPRIN-D and turn it into European capacity rather than just Made in Germany. That would be a breakthrough innovation in European science policy. In other words, a European science policy that was not 27 + 1 (the one being the Commission), but an effort that integrated national capacities.
The British ARIA is at an earlier stage than either the Commission or German examples. Knowing Conservative, particularly Brexit, science policy, which is founded on amnesia, the agency will not last long before someone has another bright idea and it falls into decline. The message is that you have to stick with the project, probably for several decades, not lose interest.(3)
Obviously, plenty of people thought about investing in risky science and technology before. What, for example, are the differences between the EIC and past programs associated with EIB such as Innovation 2000 (i2i) or, if we take it further back, Airbus?
The answers to that question are not clear but, in my view, are crucial because we need to be asking precisely what EIC adds to already well-established European Investment Bank (EIB) capacity. By involving the EIB, indeed, the Commission seems to have decided that the innovation council is within the conventional EIB wheelhouse (although it seems Ehler somewhat disagrees with that proposition due to his call for a new agency).
My impression is always that the Commission would like to contract out the bulk of science policy to private consultancy firms, operating agents, etc., if they have not already done so to quite a large extent. This implies that discussion of which particular bureaucracy delivers a given policy is perhaps somewhat moot because consultants will become the delivery agent regardless of who manages the contracts.
One might hope that fund managers, wherever they are located, will be looking to understand where they want to create inter-European competition or segmentation, as against where they want consolidation of proprietary technologies (such as by M&A or alliance formation). The latter case might include energy devices where systemic solutions combining developments in different sectors would be productive.
There might also be space to think through old questions about whether investment is in devices , people, or companies, or all of them, and to what extent. These questions would not be magically solved by invoking deep tech.
Evidently, investing with such a systemic grasp of technology, societal priorities, and political realities, would be a complex business. It would also require substantial legal expertise in relevant areas. These competencies are not found ready-made in the private sector or academia and are rare also in the governmental sector.
Turning now to the Commission approach on science and international cooperation, COM/2021/252 final, dated 18 May 2021, which talks a lot about protecting European interests.
Most of the political parties in the EP seem to endorse it.(4) We can, however, also detect obvious unease from the left of the science policy caucus, notably, Kaljurand (S&D), a former foreign minister.
How should we continue with the topic of being more sovereign but not, let’s say, irritating the rest of the world, not sending the wrong signals?
Kaljurand (addressing Šefčovič), STOA Panel, 16 Sep 2021 (around 9-10 minutes into the recording)
Her question in part gets to what we consider the purpose of science and cooperation policy. In other words, whether it is somehow subsumed to geopolitical goals as a weapon of war by other means, or whether it is considered an element of cultural diplomacy for the production of goodwill (never so clear cut in reality).
The point also gets, more significantly in my view, to strategic questions of how European politicians conceive of the continent as an actor in global science and technology (regrettably, she did not answer her own question as we would like to hear her opinion).
We have in prospect over the next decades the whole world working to its full scientific capacity. This is an extraordinary idea, unprecedented of course, but it would not occur on European terms. Indeed, it could not occur on European terms. The record shows that Europe was the primary factor stifling that dispensation in the past through its colonialism
It is also very well known that various kinds of anti-colonial scientific projects were proposed by prominent political figures of the last century. Many were substantially modified over time and some did not live up to expectations. But, as foreseen at least since the 1990s, the Chinese Communist Party was the biggest of them and it got to a finish line first.(5)
It is mainly the left that grasped the import of the situation because we arrived to some extent at the technological dispensation sought as the endgame of decolonization and that has been talked about for years. However, it is clear even the left has not yet fully understood all the elements of that endgame.
We could say, overall, that science policy is always a passenger in the geostrategic agenda and there will be sanctimonious language in policy documents for the time being. The goodwill functions of science as cultural diplomacy persist but somehow get mixed up due to the ambiguous drafting by committee methods of the EU.
As discussed elsewhere on this website, however, there have got to be concerns with the intent and methodology of official papers such as the aforementioned COM/2021/252 as well as ERAC 1203/21 (the latter from science ministries). But there is perhaps no political space for precise discussions nor a desire to have such discussions.
This should not, however, divert analysts on the progressive side of politics from longer-term thought even if it must necessarily be conducted in private. The answers are unclear for everyone, not just Europe, but are indeed fundamental to science policy over the next decades.
Rational action and reliable knowledge
I will now turn to the second and slightly more esoteric theme in the table at the start, namely, rational action and reliable knowledge.(6) Science policy likes to stake claim over these topics, not without reason given its interests in expertise, policy advisory services and foresight. The EP science policy caucus has made comments on these issues over the last year although in quite practical ways.
We should note first that EPP and Renew representatives criticised Commission science advisory services in light of the covid crisis. Ehler (EPP) pointed out there was still no official science adviser at the Commission. He added that the ERC was not accepted in that role (following the exit of Ferrari in 2020) and that JRC was ‘not meeting its expectations as a think tank of the Commission’. Hlavacek (Renew) said he agreed with those points and also referred to issues with the Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM) but did not elaborate on them.
Ehler claimed that the import of the missing Commission text messages was that it showed von der Leyen was unsupported by advisors while negotiating with the Pfizer CEO. This seems a very generous interpretation of events.
He evidently saw a parliamentary deputation to the JRC in Sevilla planned for late July as an opportunity to ask questions about the strategic role of the JRC, although he said he did not intend ‘to burn the place to the ground’. or words to that effect There has been no public read-out from that deputation yet that I heard about.
Sources of public expertise that challenge, or potentially challenge, industry positions are not appreciated by lobbyists. The left also has its reservations about science advisory services, for example, that they have been co-opted by industry. But the tactical question is how to navigate the political ground in such a way that helps science advisory services serve the public (and does not give unwitting help to lobbyists). Answers to this question are quite difficult.
As we all heard there are big developments planned at Sevilla, namely, a new building and a mooted additional role for JRC supporting the New European Bauhaus known as NEB Lab. Not much is known about these plans.
The Bauhaus scheme has attracted interest on both left and right. The report by Ehler (EPP) and Ros Sempre (S&D) called for an NEB mission funded with €500m (Ros Sempre is an architect and academic but he does not sit in ITRE).
The Sevilla site was established in 1994, initially concerned with technology assessment and forecasting, connecting with then science commissioner Cresson’s deep interest in rational action seen through such ideas as intelligence economique.
The historical oddity is that it occupies part of the former exhibition grounds of the 1992 expo intended to celebrate the Spanish conquest of the Americas by Columbus (it is now a science park).
It is in my opinion always good tactics to circle wagons around JRC. For example, there could be a push to include industry representatives in the governance of the NEB Lab, with a view to extending this disposition deeper into the JRC. Calls for greater transparency of decision making can be read in a number of ways politically and are of course very ironic when they come from industry.
Riba i Giner and Cuffe (Greens) seem to be calling for representatives of civil society and community groups to be present in the NEB Lab governance. This sounds nice but one problem is that once you open the doors to such groups you open the doors in all directions.
These situations are complicated but a hard line on maintaining pure inter-governmentalism at the JRC often seems to me the only feasible solution (while acknowledging it has downsides).
Targeted additional funds from the host government, Spain, would encourage network building and joint projects between the Sevilla site and NGOs, universities and research institutes without as such tampering with governance. The Swiss foreign ministry have done this, in my view productively, with the UN agencies in Geneva through initiatives such as Geneva Science-Policy Interface (GSPI).
Ehler (EPP) points out the obvious that JRC is both a research center and a think tank for the Commission. It lacks legal standing in the legislative process. It seems he wants to discuss a more specified function. But, as Ehler also admits, these debates are very old.
The JRC is a particular state of being that must do all kinds of tasks. Opening up questions about focus yet again is risky. I guess there is always a danger of someone building up a head of steam for enquiries into the functioning of the JRC.
Clearly, the center is not perfect and it would be easy to find fault. If you go into the Commission you will hear trash talk about it. Perfection, though, must not be the enemy of good. Let us not get out the violins, but protection of the JRC is critical because it is one of very few European scientific assets citizens hold in their hands.
Looking beyond JRC, perhaps the most significant general contribution from science policy is sensitivity to the epistemic process as a means to acquire reliable knowledge. A secondary topic is scientific knowledge as a support for decision-making.
Acquiring knowledge of European science and research, at least the civilian forms in the public sector, does not require much more than spending time getting to know the CORDIS database (plus an idea of the activities of research institutes, universities and science ministries across the continent). I have acquired this knowledge over the years and I am yet to be convinced it needs much more than intellectual curiosity (and time).
This informs us the core investment of science advice lies with human resource not IT systems and that the investment need not be big but must be sustained. However, knowledge gathering capacity would only be part of the solution.
The discussion of particular technology such as AI in a lot of the EP discourse is a proxy for political questions such as the power of corporations. Perhaps talking about technology rather than the substantive issue produces the crucial ambiguity or social glue necessary for people to get along in politically divided settings like a parliament. I mean, who can get so passionate about AI that they want to brawl with the other person, its tough enough even staying conscious when the other person is talking about it.
The problem for often relatively low status science advisory services in responding to requests for information, however, is that they might find themselves having to resolve political differences. It is concerning as an idea to see advisory services cast in the role of political arbiters because scientists have no greater hold on wisdom or virtue than anyone else and, as history amply shows, are not philosopher monarchs. But it is also a trap that few scientists would willingly enter.
An example would be the elision of faults identified with science advisory services. The right might criticise the science advisory service because it seems to inhibit, by raising of risks, the implementation of high technology sought by multinational firms. The left objects because they see the science advisory service as a stooge of industry lobbyists. Neither commentary is necessarily unreasonable in principle, but the overall depoliticized elision is that of deficiency in general. Everyone agrees the solution lies with the firing of the science adviser who typically has few bureaucratic allies and is therefore expendable.
Ehler, in his comments, seems to constantly reach for precisions but his expectation that these could be provided by a handful of MEPs meeting briefly is, to put it mildly, optimistic. Far deeper thought would be required.
Perhaps with this idea in mind, he proposed that STOA assume the function of think tank for European science and technology policy (presumably with additional taxpayer funding). It is difficult to see how the other parties could support this idea if it were to become the EPP science think tank with Ehler as director (although indeed that would be quite interesting as a concept).
If his proposal envisages, to the contrary, a supposedly politically neutral activity, we must admit to the difficulties already described in resolving political differences through science advice.
Why not try to embed science think tank functions in the political groupings thereby encouraging the development of theories of science and technology at the political level rather than through proxies in the science advisory service?
If we are proposing the actual democratic mobilization of science and technology, it seems to me we would need to take this question seriously. The claim, often made, that science should not be politicized (or words to that effect), typically referring to the relatively small subset of civilian research funded by taxpayers, is a fascinating one to unpack.
Regrettably (and this will surprise no one), there would seem to be no capacity for science and technology policy in the party think tanks in Brussels such as Martens Center, FEPS, and so on, and no possibility of such capacity being built (the industry lobby groups do a lot work but that is definitely not what I had in mind).
Looking a little more widely, the green movement is strong on science and technology, with a relatively large capacity across Europe including even its own R&D programs. Science is fundamental to the green movement both in terms of detection of pollution and the search for solutions.
However, the ethos of the green movement is to my mind sometimes anarchist and therefore would generally take less interest in the field of the state, science policy and so on, not unreasonably given the view that the state is unlikely to deliver what is sought even in principle.
The wider left is, to the contrary, obviously very interested in the state. Lack of funds is always a factor for think tanks of the left thereby limiting analytical capacity. I think, however, the contemporary left is also not as interested in the detail of science policy as it could be (acknowledging exceptions of course).
My guess is that the topic tends to be seen as an elite activity and, therefore, the focus has not been on science policy as such, but on science in regard to particular fields such as environmental protection. This approach might sometimes be described in policy circles as science for policy (as opposed to policy for science).
It is logical to conclude that science policy is an elite field given it is primarily made by prominent businessmen and famous academics neither of whom could generally be described as with or of the people. However, we also know that epistemic process is not independent of knowledge which presents difficulties for the left.
The EU currently has seven national governments headed by the left. However, this equates to only five ministries with science and research responsibilities headed by the left, due to distribution of roles in coalition governments. If we talk about ministries with a pronounced science emphasis, the number probably falls to three (Denmark, Spain and Portugal, respectively, Petersen, Morant and Fortunato, recalling, though, the latter identifies herself as independent).
My understanding is that the Swedish government abolished a separate science ministry last year and merged it into the education department (a standard bureaucratic move that admittedly goes in and out of fashion). Science policy might get lost politically due, obviously, to the higher profile of education.
Germany is one of the more interesting cases both because its position as a leading force in science and research policy but also the novelty of the greens in a position of federal power.
Obviously the greens do not hold the research portfolio which was a point that I found personally disappointing from an intellectual perspective. However, it would seem that green ideas on science are present in federal policy, citing an analysis of the coalition agreement by Banholzer.(7)
DATI, a federal agency that will try to monetize university research, and (a reformed) SPRIN‐D are noted as examples of agencies potentially reflecting both green and liberal ethos. The tension of such ideas is material for anarchist science policy.
The reliance on academic experts as scientific interlocutors on the left raises further interesting questions. You do not need to be an anarchist to recognize that academia rarely supplies dissident R&D. The most well known example is the chemical data gap whereby the research needed to understand the dangers of xenobiotics is not done due to lack of funds. Therefore, expertise is literally absent.
There is obviously no easy intellectual solution to this phenomenon in which we see generally patchy R&D coverage of issues important to the left as opposed to the relatively more researched issues that matter to big business.
The second part of that problem is how we act rationally at the EU level based on the scientific knowledge we acquire. One view is perhaps that regulation is the main lever of control. The argument therefore seems to be about over or under regulating innovation, eliding, respectively, left and right. In other words, regulation holding back useful technology as opposed to minimizing its dangers.
Obviously we benefit from a large academic literature on the relations between scientific knowledge and regulations (and an interesting complimentary literature on science and standards in international trade).(8) Some of the best work has been produced by legal scholars.
However, as many point out, there is no EU instruction manual for transfer of scientific knowledge into regulations. It is therefore not known exactly how science and research activities such as those undertaken by the JRC, procured through framework programs, consultancy, or other routes, relate to the formulation of regulations.
Looking a bit more widely than regulations, there are a range of other policy measures that could be undertaken such as subsidization and communications. On the left, of course, there is probably a lot more space for interventions such as government enterprises. How would all of these relate to knowledge derived from science and research?
Commission officials might refer to another (possibly related) concept, integrated action, represented as I have seen in presentation slides, literally, by cogs spinning independently and then being brought into mesh (the metaphor from the Commission evoked Weber, but the intention would appear to have been sincere).
I am not suggesting there will be one normative view of the varied connections between knowledge and action. But I think we might logically look for a general framework summarized, perhaps, over a few succinct pages of text, of the ways that legislators expect to connect the dots. This area, however, despite its evident importance, seems relatively under-specified in the discourse.(9)
Theories of technological determinism
Technological determinism would seem to be an absolute requirement for many science policy discussions. The technologies themselves are not interesting. It is the implications they raise.
Yet I think we would seek vainly in public discourse for a clearly stated theory of this technological determinism. The theory therefore has qualities of folk science (or, perhaps, doxa) rather than one generated by rational investigation, although that is not to devalue it.
It needs to be pointed out that any theory of technological determinism espoused in the EP is not unique to it. Rather, it articulates many of the accepted perspectives concerning science policy (as one would perhaps expect in a representative body like a parliament, which is why I think MEP discourse is such a convenient place to look for it).
One obvious aspect of the theory of technological determinism is that it is not, generally, an historical one. Some devices might be considered by the EP as ‘mature and ready-to-use’ [a reference made to AI, p. 49, 2021/0106(COD)], while others have not been sufficiently developed (gene editing).
However, the overall assumption appears to be that the main effects of the technology can only be expected in the future or, if they are already visible, that they are likely to accumulate in the years ahead rather than diminish. Whether the function of this accumulation is likely to be linear or perhaps even exponential or subject to tipping points is not specified.
Acknowledging there are rare exceptions to the overall emphasis and that it also has definite logic, we should however always keep in mind that ‘the hand mill gave us the feudal lord’ is a different proposition than ‘the hand mill shall give us the feudal lord’ (citing the honourable member for Trier).
An argument can be made that the wrong technology has been identified as the determinant or that the determining power of the technology has been overestimated. The debunking literature on various technologies is easy to find (see elsewhere on this website). At best, we are constantly discovering the nature of technological determinism in real time. For all we know, the salience of AI might have peaked last year, only to decline into obscurity in the decades ahead.
Mostly we hear about apps, sometimes a bit on biotechnology. If you invite app developers (or, for that matter, gene editors) to comment, of course, they will say these technologies are crucial. But, let us have some perspective. Apps and gene editing will not stop viruses spreading or float barges stranded due to the Rhine drying out.
There is probably a need to move discussion beyond single devices that would appear to have no chance of solving the problems we face or, at the least, provide actual evidence that they could solve them and in what combinations.
Occasionally we see challenges to the app narrative (from the left) such as discussions about natural medicine. My impression is that these are considered minor sidelights. The strength of natural medicine as a topic is it is a complex technological system whereas the high tech, despite the varied names it receives, is mainly one thing (computer code).
As already noted, technologies are probably being discussed for the most part as a facade for larger political questions. I guess everyone knows this. But at the same time I wonder if anyone is falling into the trap of thinking the technology under discussion really has much to do with larger political questions.
In a few cases, we are not all talking about the same technology even though we are using the same word. An obvious problem in the case of dual use technology such as computers or atomic power where questions about civil applications blend systemically with questions about security posture.
Political analysis of why particular visions of the future are being presented at particular times by particular people would be useful but I have to say you will rarely see it.
A second point within our putative folk theory of technological determinism relates to the mechanisms by which technology acts on productive relations. This is obviously connected to how people react to new devices, such as, what happens when people read social media posts. Or it could be to do with the nefarious intentions of states, companies, hackers, and so on, who operate devices such as AI that invade privacy.
We could imagine on the conservative side the main goal is the use of technology to maintain productive relations as they are now or were at some supposed ideal point in the past. Whereas the left might seek progressive change through technology.
This is too much of a simplification. But one could envisage a reactionary innovation policy as much as one could a progressive one. In the energy field, as implied by commentators on the left, settings are of a reactionary nature citing electric cars, hydrogen, and so on, which are intended to maintain the status quo.
The varied mechanisms of our technological determinist theory, according to one idea, can be uncovered through investigation in the humanities and social sciences as found in university departments. This perspective seems, according to my impression, more prominent on the left. The right puts more emphasis on the opinions of C-suite executives as a means to uncover reliable knowledge.
Who is more realistic is difficult to say. Foresight seems to be accepted as a means of detecting possible futures although its impact on policy formulation is unclear. There is the risk that we over-estimate the capacity of anyone to uncover factors in real-time particularly if they are looking at the wrong things (let alone predict the future).
One could say, overall, scattered across documents, we can discern a possible theory of technological determinism that provides a framework for debate. It evidently has some deficiencies but these do not seem unsurmountable.
The supposed role of the legislator in the technological determinist theory seems to me the least explored. Yet this question is perhaps the most important given it presents legislators as active shapers rather than passive observers.
History
The history of EP involvement in science policy will be added at a later date.
Conclusion
The covid crisis that killed more than a million people already on the continent illustrates that something went horribly wrong with the ability of Europe to wield science and research despite, by international standards, significant public funding.
Other countries did better obviously on a fraction of the budget (citing, e.g., Chen and Assefa, 2021). Indeed, if we consider the counterfactual of western countries acting as effectively as the best performers in Asia, the covid crisis might have seemed, in retrospect, like a near miss rather than a global disaster.
Relief for Europe came mainly from the private sector, notably, large pharmaceutical firms able to make vaccine, and the producers of face masks (the little-known history of melt-blown polymers is noted elsewhere on this website).
While it would seem at the moment that crises are not being adequately addressed or are even being ignored in public discourse, I would like to believe that questions are on everyone’s minds even if they have not yet been fully articulated.(10)
If the Europeans need a new dispensation, who is going to come up with it? The building of a credible intellectual project in science policy seems a valuable contribution. It would not be expensive financially but would need more intellectual investment than currently being given.
I find some contemporary left wing analysis of relations between capitalism and technology (which is often read to mean digitalization) not completely explanatory.(11) At least, it might not be an improvement on the analysis of technology that Marx originally proposed.
On the right, we often see buzzwords intended to hide conventional business reflexes such as asset sweating. One might say we are offered an extremely outdated analysis that does not understand our aspirations.
I hope many of those involved in these varied analyses are sincere. I do not intend criticism of them. It is simply that the problem is very big. No one, as far as I am aware, has credible answers at their respective points of the political spectrum.
I would like to think the EP could be a place where interesting new agendas developed but perhaps not in the ways we expected.
The EP is the second largest parliamentary institution in the world by number of electors (after the Lok Sabha). While it has regrettably provided sustenance for a few dangerous far right demagogues, and is therefore in many ways politically unsafe, science policy is such an obscure area it seems unlikely, as far as I know, to be threatened.
However, we have to keep in mind that there is little possibility of progressive science policy developing in the EU at present given the political composition of the majority of the member governments.
If we were to look for progressive thought from science ministries, perhaps we might hope to find it south of the Pyrenees (the two national governments and some of the Spanish autonomous administrations). Spain is a particularly significant factor given, by world standards, its big science and research budget. Germany of course always remains one to watch.
(1) All analysis in this part of the website comprises: a précis of the report under consideration; my own commentary, having reflected on the report and the wider context of the policy problem; brief notes on what is known about the historical background of the problem and what solutions have been sought in the past (nihil sub sole novum); and a conclusion. Please be advised that the discussion is my personal views at a given point in time and typically based on very limited thought, analysis and research, and should therefore not be relied upon too much.
(2) I think the intriguing question is why European health systems, a mix of private, mutual, state and quasi-state bodies, never established a joint R&D enterprise themselves. I would personally encourage scientists to set up such activities rather than waiting for officials. Regrettably, as a rule, scientists tend to launch venture capital-backed private entities not cooperative enterprises. Hopes of biomedical anarchism remain on hold.
(3) Citing, for example, the demise of Energy Technologies Institute, which was a kind of ARIA for energy, a fact that everyone now apparently forgot (it was created by a Labour government). If we shone the torch deeper into the crypt of UK science policy, we would spot the remains of the National Enterprise Board (or British Technology Group as it became known under Conservative administration, with markedly less ambitious goals) and, perhaps, also Innovate UK.
(4) The main EPP talking point has been around academic freedom. The meaning they attribute to the term is not fixed and most often it is a term of political art rather than a legal definition. Their ingenious tendency to elide the term in reference to different situations around the globe lubricates political agreement but does not necessarily aid the search for solutions. Ehler (EPP) repeated his request for EP involvement in science and cooperation policy given the political character of decision making. It is difficult to read his exact intention.
(5) An intriguing reflection is offered by Phalkey and Lam, 2016, ‘Science of giants: China and India in the twentieth century’ in: BJHS Themes.
(6) This is a reference to Thomas, 2015, Rational Action: The Sciences of Policy in Britain and America, 1940-1960.
(8) There is a big academic literature. I am not an academic. Boudia, Jas, Jasanoff, and Wagner are among the most important authors I read. A brief reading list. Jas, 2017, Millefeuilles institutionnels et production d’ignorance dans le « gouvernement » des substances chimiques dangereuses, Raison présente; Boudia and Jas, 2016, Savoir, ignorance et incertitude dans les régulations des problèmes sanitaires et environnementaux, La Lettre de l’InSHS; Jas and Boudia, 2014, Powerless Science? Science and Politics in a Toxic World (crucial introductory chapter entitled ‘The greatness & misery of science in a toxic world’); Wagner, 2003, Commons ignorance: the failure of environmental law to produce needed information on health and the environment, Duke Law Journal; Wagner, 1995, THE SCIENCE CHARADE IN TOXIC RISK REGULATION, Columbia Law Review; Wagner, 2000, The triumph of technology-based standards, University of Illinois Law Review; Wagner, 1997, Choosing ignorance in the manufacture of toxic products, Cornell Law Review. Jasanoff, works on risk and regulation and expertise and regulatory science.
(9) The Science for Policy Handbook, published by JRC officials in 2020, does not address regulation in great detail. As much as we could understand a theory from that account, it seems to revolve around foresight, behavioural science, impact evaluation, and computer modelling as the primary methods to connect scientific knowledge to regulation. EU-ANSA has done some work on this topic but that disappeared without trace.
(10) The German Science Council programmed a working group on the science system and the zeitenwende. A think tank potentially exploring a topic that resonates beyond the German borders. WR work program 2022-2023 (pp. 19-20)
(11) The Transnational Institute (TNI) State of the World provides a summary of analysis from the left. The discourse of the right is everywhere, obviously having a better funded PR department, in such places as the Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution in the World Economic Forum (WEF).
Science Think Tank 