It might seem an odd approach at this point to reflect back on a science policy analysis published 20 years ago, edited by Zeleza and Kakoma (the former, a prominent economic historian). But in my view, thought on what was said and recommended then, and what has been achieved since, offers a relatively solid basis in the complex mix of arguments that develop when we look at the present.
As part of the Zeleza and Kakoma volume, which was entitled In Search of Modernity: Science and Technology in Africa, the science policy analyst, Dr. Akin Adubifa published a survey of science and technology capacity in Africa and made proposals for its future development.
That chapter, which will be my focus, is not often remembered now and indeed rarely cited, despite its obvious salience and the high professional status of its author.
Dr. Adubifa expressed the view that results for science and technology in Africa had ‘fallen below expectation’ over the decades prior to 2003. ‘Science and technology sectors and professions are still in their infancy…science is not fully-appreciated…academic communities are largely isolated from their global colleagues’.
His argument overall was that ‘African countries cannot be said to have acquired adequate scientific and technological capabilities to meet the challenges of globalization, particularly the attendant international negotiations in the economic, financial and environmental regimes’.
I am sure there would be changes to the narrative if his work was done again today. The emergence of new historical data through the efforts of professional historians as well as analyses grounded in the political economy of science might lead us to revisions.
But the claim that African states could not yet wield science and technology at the level needed to assert supremacy in areas of strategic interest (my words), well, this would still seem salient.
Such a reading would indeed focus our attention on what type of science and technology is needed to articulate strategic interests, and what could realistically be done to encourage this science and technology to emerge.
At the same time as making quite negative statements, Dr. Adubifa also believed there had nevertheless been ‘an array of accomplishments under challenging circumstances’ ,
Those challenging circumstances were a lack of funds, compounded by capricious donor policies that obviated long-term strategy (my words, again). These had driven a period of ‘stagnation, degradation and obsolescence’ of research infrastructure over the proceeding 20 years.
Stepping back a little, we should note into the early 1980s, visions of a renewed science, technology and industrial strategy were viable in Africa. A good example, which I describe later, would be the solar energy programs that originated in west Africa but were mooted to expand across the continent as part of the famous Lagos Plan.
By the late 1980s, ambitions, however, became improbable and, indeed, appeared quite guileless. This was an era of structural adjustment. The policy was instigated by governments outside the continent with the result, if not the goal, of undermining African industrial autonomy.
Accordingly, the Lagos Plan was cancelled. High-tech was cut. science and technology projects went bankrupt. Political and economic conditions became turbulent, including for science and research. Western governments were rightly named as the major villains in postmortems that followed.
In this context, Dr. Adubifa alluded to the destructive behavior of donors. But he also noted useful donor interventions and identified what made these work, as well as highlighting the agency of African scientists, all of which held promise.
He then made about eight major recommendations that were expressly addressed to national governments, the World Bank and donor institutions (table beneath).
Recommendations by Dr. Akin Adubifa (2003) on African science and technology
| Recommendation made in 2003 | Degree of implementation as of 2024* |
| Promote public awareness of science and technology | Limited |
| Intensify science policy research and analysis | Moderate |
| Convene working groups at a national level that bring together key stakeholders in science and technology | Stakeholders seem to be well networked. But without additional funds to support ideas that emerge from discussions, networking would not be enough |
| Establish a funding mechanism dedicated to national science and technology development with help of development banks | Moderate |
| Strengthen policy, supervisory and regulatory institutions | Moderate |
| Strengthen national academies of science | Substantial. Cheap to implement but broader positive benefits uncertain. |
| Instigate ‘technology missions’ in areas such as renewable energy, food production, sanitation and IT | A few explicit examples known in South Africa with some degree of implementation. Technology missions can also be read ex-post into successful programs like wild polio eradication. |
| Encourage more extensive documentation of science and expertise, e.g., through publication | Substantial |
The extent to which his recommendations were read by those who rule is not known. But, taking them with the seriousness they deserve as an intellectual proposition, what can we say in hindsight about their implementation?
The recommendations were definitely of an elite nature and addressed to political elites; they were not addressed to working scientists or the wider public. They were also very much made, it seems, with a view to building capacity at the nation state rather than continental scale, and therefore in slight counterpoint to pan-African plans.
One barrier to going beyond the general observation that the ideas were politically viable, not merely aspirational – there is no adequate literature examining the theme in its entirety. In any case, it would require a synoptic view of developments in all the AU member states, which we lack. It is nevertheless possible to draw together some subjective impressions.
Within the limits of the data I gathered, I believe, therefore, we can discern the outlines of a positive story. It would seem that Dr. Akin Adubifa’s proposals have, to a degree, become reality thanks to the extraordinary efforts of many people.
We might note that, remarkably enough, some elements of the Lagos Plan from 1980 have also been delivered.
Of course, the realization of these proposals has perhaps not been at the scale sought or always in a fully-intentional or strategic way. The goal of industrial autonomy in the AU member states remains unresolved. (Similar statements could be made for other places such as the de-industrialized West. The contrast is rather one of affluence and poverty not industrialization as such.)
Let’s now look in a bit more detail at what happened over the last 20 years to bring us to the present, using the above recommendations as a structure, but also more recent analyses.
Turning first to what might be said on the concept of promoting public awareness of science and technology, a recent review by Margaret Kaseje and Verah Okeyo, drew some conclusions as to the state of public awareness that are worth noting.
Besides making stock observations concerning risks and benefits of digital media, the authors also stated that ‘there is still a chasm on effective communication with the ordinary citizens’.
‘The spread of information has been hampered by poor internet and electricity connectivity and high costs of phone and laptop devices, particularly in rural and remote regions’, they wrote, while ‘information flow is largely influenced by political systems where information is state-controlled and vetted for political correctness, and in cases where learning institutions and media houses have been under state control.’
Declining advertising revenues undermined the conventional business model for the press which impacted coverage of science and technology. As a counterpoint, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funded courses for journalists in its fields of interest.
The above implies a situation not as rosy as hoped but also suggests some means to improve things.
In regard to expansion of policy research, summary data appears to be lacking. A report from 2008 argued that ‘The bulk of STI policy research and advocacy in Africa takes place in agriculture. Other areas that benefit from relatively significant policy research include health and education.’
That comment might suggest a relative deficit in analysis of other areas such as industrial policy (it is impossible, however, to say). Two well-known entities, if these can be said to be bellwethers, namely, the African Technology Policy Studies Network (cited above) (ATPS) and the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) continue to operate (the latter is an actual institute with tens of staff).
Analysis of the publications of these entities over the past two decades would be an informative data point. But it seems overall there have been few significant moves to expand capacity in these institutions, such as we know.
Ambitions to build an extensive African-based cadre of policy advisers, analysts and consultancy firms date at least as far back as the Lagos Plan. Regrettably, I am not aware of synoptic data on whether this has been achieved. But there have been success stories and, indeed, the successes may take forms that are not publicly visible.
Think Africa Partnership (TAP) funded by the World Bank is primarily concerned with economic knowledge but substantially touches on matters of science and expertise. >>https://openair.africa/
Turning to the issues of governmental capacity such as the working groups, a specialized fund and strengthened bureaucracy to deliver science and research, the question of implementation is again difficult to measure due to a lack of data.
Dr. Akin Adubifa envisaged working groups as ‘vehicles for responsible national dialogue among key stakeholders.’ The AU uncovered 163 networks that might in theory fulfill this role. There are also a number of pan-African networks in particular topic areas such as FARA (agriculture).
The African Union Network of Sciences (AUNS) was established as a ‘platform where scientists, engineers, technology developers, innovators and inventors…interact, cooperate, exchange information/knowledge and complement one another in research and academic work.’ It seems like a good idea as an entry point to raise the legibility of networking activities but, regrettably, AUNS is not resourced, citing a news report dated 2021.
According to my analysis of a World Bank database covering a sample of 20 AU member states, it seems the reported ‘number of public paid employees’ fell by about half a million (13%) between the first and second decades of this century. Conversely, ‘individuals with tertiary education as a share of public paid employees’ and ‘females, as a share of public paid employees’ increased, respectively, by 30% and 16%.
The trend in headcount does not seem promising in regard to state capacities. However, the state apparatus also became more expert and more representative. These would seem to be positive changes notably from the perspective of science and research.
AU member states operate distinct funds that could be germane to science and research. Donors may of course play substantial roles in these funds but at least, in principle, strategy falls somewhat under the control of African government officials (although of course we cannot make any solid determinations).
I would like to make a distinction from donor funds, which we will discuss later, and for which there is not even window-dressing concerning African control (monies delivered by private firms or philanthropists are obviously outside scope of this kind of analysis).
The African funds fall, approximately-speaking, into two categories, namely, (1) loans made by sovereign wealth funds and development banks; and (2) grants.
The latter category would derive from national funding mechanisms typically focused on universities (research institutions and companies may also be in scope of these funds), as well as multilateral schemes intended to support scientific activities across borders like PASET RSIF.
The trends in the size of these funds is impossible to determine schematically. The former category would seem to be quite large in scale, i.e., €multi-millions. Of course, there are overlaps between categories as well, e.g., the World Bank funds PASET RSIF.
Africa harbours a very small number of its own sovereign wealth funds. Not much can be said about them in regard to science and technology but the Ghana Petroleum Funds reported paying monies for the ‘construction of 10 regional STEAM Centres’ (16.8m US$).
In the case of the development banks, which is of course where Dr. Akin Adubifa placed his emphasis, available data suggests that loans containing the keyword ‘science’ increased about five times in the first two decades of this century as compared to the last two decades of the previous century. The trend would therefore seem to be following the direction proposed in 2003.
The focus of the development banks appears to be baseline funding for universities with the goal of expanding local science and expertise (table beneath).
One notable project – a science and technology park in Angola to be built by PAN-China Construction Group and planned to scale at about 62k square metres (about one fifth the area of the WISTA science park near Berlin, as comparison). It is reportedly costing the African Development Bank 35m US$ and includes both renovation of existing scientific facilities as well as new buildings and a greenhouse.
The rationale behind spending so much of the budget on this park is presumably to encourage interaction between the private sector and university-based elements of the bank’s investment operation.
Scientific projects funded by the African Development Bank (examples)
| Project | Scale (€)* | Years operational | Achievement(s)** |
| Angola – Science and Technology Development | 80m | 2016-present | Equipment of scientific facilities; building a science and technology park; R&D grants; scholarships for postgraduate training (Brazil and Portugal) |
| Uganda – Support to Higher Education, Science and Technology (HEST) | 80m | 2013-2019 | Construction and equipment of new and ‘rehabilitated’ scientific facilities; ICT connectivity; training and scholarships |
| Nelson Mandela Institutes – African Institutions of Science and Technology | 11m | 2016-2022 | Equipment of scientific facilities; vehicle for field studies; expanded postgraduate training |
| African Pharmaceutical Technology Foundation |
The Science Granting Council Initiative (SGCI), which was established in 2015, links national bureaucracies that administer some of the university funds on the continent. It seems SGCI is a networking initiative rather than one primarily intended to increase the size of the funds under management.
Overall, we could say that many funds have been established but not all of them have been sufficiently resourced.
There has also been an expansion in the numbers of academies of science in African countries, citing the establishment of ‘at least 20’ new academies over the past two decades.
There has been an effort to strengthen academies. The African Science Academies Development Initiative (ASADI), funded with 20m US$ by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, was deemed a ‘successful’ example of that latter effort.
At the same time, we should note that donors withdrew support from the African Academy of Sciences, citing information given in a news report dated August 2022.
The broader question is whether it is a good idea in principle to build academies of science. Concerns arise as to whether an academy, in particular, a donor-backed academy, is likely to deliver progressive action. Such concerns would need to be answered on a case-by-case basis.
In this regard, a recent study by Dr. Dorothy Mutheu Ngila, concerning the South African and Ugandan academies of sciences, makes valuable points.
The author concluded that there had been an overemphasis on the significance of the members of these academies in communications around the delivery of science advice. Rather, Dr. Ngila identified an ‘ecosystem of human capabilities’ which was far wider than the members and essential for effective work yet perhaps was not fully acknowledged.
There were also problems reported in terms of communications between the academies and government departments as well as difficulties in obtaining a wide spectrum of expertise. It is only my guess, but these factors could have impaired the delivery of reliable knowledge for government decision-making (which appeared to be the emergent goal of the program).
One might therefore conclude academies have not been as powerful an intervention as hoped, albeit being a relatively inexpensive one as they are based mainly on volunteerism.
Turning now to the concept of technology missions; this is an intriguing topic in the sense it provides a possible counterpoint to the rhetoric of sustainable development goals. It is another type of goal that does not fit the SDG framework, and is older than it, but remains salient as a means to talk about science policy.
Although the idea of goal-directed programs is, in a way, ageless, Rajiv Gandhi is the political author of the specific term citing his technology mission program conducted in India after 1987.
Technology missions were explicitly promoted in South Africa, referencing India, in the mid-1990s following the end of the Apartheid dictatorship, noting the report Building a New South Africa (sponsored by the Canadian government). It is presumably this rhetoric that Dr. Adubifa referenced.
What can we say about the context in South Africa? The end of apartheid led to a particular kind of crisis in science and research. Many scientists were surely discredited given their gruesome role in supporting white supremacy. Political rationales for investment within the defunct regime, notably, energy autarky and accumulating weapons, disappeared.
Officials in the ANC were obviously cognizant of the issues regarding the need to rehabilitate science and technology in the South African state. Technology missions were presumably a part of what has been characterised as a ‘cautious’ approach to science and technology promoted by Mandela, with a view to mobilising change within the new state apparatus and among donors.
An OECD report dated 2007 claimed that ‘in effect, half the four major technology missions in the 2002 National Strategy seem not to have been developed and implemented…the proportion may possibly be larger because the status of the sub-mission concerned with ICT is not clear’.
We might with hindsight say the reform process of science in South Africa was, overall, highly effective, although the specific contribution of mission rhetoric in the policy mix is not easy to gauge. But in principle it would have seemed a useful way, among others, to communicate change across the bureaucracy, scientific community and others.
Looking northwards across the continent, there have no doubt been many missions explicit or implicit in other policies or, at least, the concept can be read into activities post-hoc.
Regrettably, again, I am not aware of any schematic data on this topic or, indeed, the necessarily multilingual analysis of terminology. Therefore, I do not know if the idea spread more widely on the continent, which I believe is what Dr. Adubifa wanted to see.
Among the transnational interventions on the continent, we might label the eradication of wild polio (successfully accomplished in 2020) as a relatively well-documented technology mission, noting, however, that the term was not used in relation to the program. The covid response, the most dramatic technology mission of our era, awaits full appraisal.,but some aspects seem pretty good.
The term missions of course resonates, mainly, it has to be said, as a way to mobilise bureaucracies that are believed (by someone) to otherwise under-perform.
Yet, already overburdened bureaucracies, particularly ones that have been cut, would struggle with being given missions to undertake. Put another way, you cannot expect much if you degrade headcount while simultaneously exhorting the delivery of lots of missions.
Without doubt, visible documentation of science and research in Africa increased, citing, for example, Prof. Sooryamoorthy (2020), wherein, the total number of scientific publications from the continent tripled between 2000-2015 (from about 38k to 120k, in the periods, respectively, 2000-2004 and 2010-2015).
Legibility of African scientific institutions also, I would assume, increased, due to many now having websites. Obviously, greater investment would improve the depth and topicality of website content as well as translation into multiple languages.
Visibility of individual scientists would have increased due to social media platforms. But again investment would be needed to give individual scientists more time to engage with social media, and so on, as part of routine work.
Scientific biographies and autobiographies by African scientists, privately published, have also increased in number recently and are often available online, as have histories of science on the continent after independence. These intellectual phenomena, as well as the rediscovery, by a new generation, of classic works from writer-bureaucrats such as T. M. Aluko, offers analysts an ever-more nuanced picture of what it was to do science in Africa.
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