A rational UK policy in frontier technology

What would a rational UK policy in “frontier technology” look like?

High technology, frontier technology, and so on, appear crucial in asserting national importance on the global stage. The OECD talks about “synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, robotics and quantum technologies” as the pivotal exemplars (although others cite a wider range, and relevant policies of China and the USA in particular need to be studied and understood because they play out in different contexts).

While it is not clear exactly why these particular technologies have such geopolitical potency, they evidently draw the attention of many politicians, who claim oracular powers in seeing a rosy future in which these technologies play an important role.

Yet the future cannot be known and, on many occasions, technological horizon scanning has turned out to be misleading. Anyone claiming to have identified lines of scientific investigation that lead to the future is talking out of their hat, not least because there is not one future nor one “scientific frontier”.

Putting aside cynicism, the closest I can come to a rational explanation for the rhetoric is that these technologies are felt to be weapons in a partly symbolic, partly real, form of war, perhaps reflecting a longer-standing inter-mixture of categories represented by such terms as “dual use”. This derives from the centrality of the US military-industrial complex and contemporary capitalism in shaping our modern conception of science and research alongside much else.

Advances in technique, once assimilated into society have also fudged the distinction between “war” and “peace” creating uncertainty about their respective meanings which affects the forming of policy…The fudging…raises an entire range of complex problems. Industrialization during the last [19th] century increased the options open to policy; it has now reached the point of multiplying the ambiguities.

Pearton, 1982, The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy, War, and Technology since 1830, p. 258

Almost like we are living in the Sun Tzu “all warfare is based on deception” classic (which, indeed, fascinates Western military planners), rhetoric (hype) and reality intermingle in the overall presentation of the symbolic “weapon” to intended interlocutors. A quantum computer does not exist, but talking about it invokes an impression. Ultimately, it does not seem clear who is deceiving whom.

I cannot be totally serious in seeking an explanation but, perhaps, we ultimately need to agree on one and I do believe someone with deep expertise ought to do a synthesis (the closest I read to an attempt was Warren Chin’s recent, maverick, account, War, Technology and the State).

Back in the humdrum, real, world, UK science and tech policy has several purposes which are much more practical and indeed, useful. Therefore, unfortunately, we need to understand how policy could cater to the notions of the powerful, while also being rational in the conventional sense. By this I mean that the country would be perceived as scientifically prestigious with an indispensable position at the “top table” while avoiding excessive opportunity costs.

(High tech policy would be considered separate, and delivered at a much lower budget, than other major science policies, such as those intended to support the delivery of societal goals like decarbonization, pollution control and public health; and to strengthen prestigious regional universities distributed across the country, notably in economically under-performing regions. Experience suggests these varied goals should be kept separate and delivered through separate policies and, indeed, by separate organizations. For example, regional budgets ought to be delivered autonomously by regional authorities, with any minimal central capacity concerned solely with advisory and PR.)

Given the country had historically focused on science and research in universities, over decades, the high technology program would build on such experience sustaining esoteric academic expertise.

The UK has experimented with different kinds of delivery mechanism. Typically, these interventions revolved around one or more of the following:

• University consortia, featuring, in a prominent role, one or more of the four leading universities.
• Programs managed in conjunction with large, historically « British » firms (e.g., Energy Technologies Institute).
• Programs managed in conjunction with large overseas firms (e.g., Google).
• Programs designed to encourage patenting of university research through technology transfer offices and the creation of “spin outs”.

While all these varied initiatives had limitations, the major learning was that the most effective policy was developed through a combination of approaches across a range of targeted high technology areas.

Specific measures typically included:

• High quality scientific publications in major international journals (basic requirement).
• Generation of extensive grey literature such as policy reports through an additional “social science” module.
• Active participation in relevant multilateral forums; international travel to conferences. Senior figures capable of championing the program on the international stage and among decision-makers in the private sector and governments.
• PhD training for a combination of UK residents and overseas students.
• Innovative PR activities.

The proposed new high tech program would seek to shepherd current high tech initiatives into a single policy with a unitary budget, likely with a single strategy group, and a single social science and PR module “think tank” (the latter, primarily aimed at generating grey literature such as policy reports likely to resonate with influential target audiences in Asia, Europe, the USA, and multilateral forums). Ministerial announcements would be planned with the goal of telling a simple, compelling story as it unfolded.

Outside of these areas of activity, there would be flexibility in the scientific programs, as each high tech field has its own ways of working; there ought to be minimum interference in existing structures, with the goal of placing leading scientists in overall control of the scientific program and ensuring a maximum degree of scientific autonomy.

I currently have concerns about the scientific quality of the UK research enterprise, despite claims it is “world-leading”. The modest goal would therefore be at a minimum to sustain quality and international visibility centered around a charismatic group of leading scientists in the universities; the program would be appraised on that basis.